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in direct conflict with the Harrellcase. The statutes are identical, therefore they must be considered together.
Statutory classification is reasonable when the characteristics in the class established are germane to the purpose of
the legislation." The purpose of the classification is to provide personnel better fitted to secure improved registration of
voters. Thus, if the characteristics of the class relate to
the functions of the office the classification is reasonable.
The class established consists of those holding membership in
political parties. A member of a political party has a definite interest in protecting registration. The functions of the
office deal with registration of voters and the protection of
17
their interests. This is enough to sustain the classification.
Though sustaining the classification necessitates overrulling the Harrell case,' 8 the result is sound. The statute by
insuring a bi-partisan board better protects the voters against
the possibility of registration fraud. The difficulty if not
impossibility of securing a completely impartial board or official argues strongly for the bi-partisan board.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COMMERCE CLAUSE STATE REGULATION OF
FEDERAL WAREHOUSES
A dealer in grain brought a complaint before the Illinois
Commerce Commission charging warehousemen, operating a
public warehouse for the storage of grain in Illinois, with
violations of Illinois warehouse laws.1 The warehousemen had
been licensed by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to
16.

Board of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N.E. 158 (1934) ;
Fountain Park v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927);
Hirth-Krause v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N.E. 1 (1912).
17. Cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (held "... . a difference
in fact or opinion . . ." is sufficient to sustain a classification).

18.

1.

It does not follow that the Evansville or Holt cases need be overruled. There is no apparent relationship between the normal duties
of the police and fire departments and an interest in political
parties to sustain the classification in these two cases.
Illinois Public Utilities Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1945)
e_111 %, §§ 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 41, 49, 49(a), and 50; Illinois Grain
Warehouse Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1945) c.114, §§ 293326(a). These sections relate to regulation of rates, discrimination, dual position of warehousemen, mixing of grain, rebates,
unsafe elevators, abandonment of service, and the filing and
publishing of rates. Petitioner also alleged violations of §§ 8a(3),
21, and 27 of the Public Utilities Act pertaining to certain aspects
of financing and control of financial structures.
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the United States Warehouse Act.2 The District Court dismissed the suit to enjoin proceedings before the Commission.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that the Warehouse Act superseded the authority of the Illinois Commission to regulate any of the subject matter of
the complaint s On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed as to those alleged
violations of the Illinois statutes which were in any way
regulated by the Warehouse Act 4 but was reversed as to
those alleged violations which were not in any way regulated
by that Act.5 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation,67 Sup.
Ct. 1146 (1947) (Frankfurter and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting.)
The main issue before the Court was the interpretation
of the Warehouse Act in terms of Congressional intent. For
if, as the warehousemen claimed, Congress clearly indicated
in §29 of the Warehouse Act6 that warehousemen who were
licensed by the Secretary of Agriculture were not subject to
any state regulation, the supremacy clause7 ruled out other
considerations. Therefore questions usually presented in
commerce clause cases (the local or national nature of the
subject matter, the desirability of balancing freedom from
restraint on interstate commerce in respect to state police
power, traditional regulation by states, and the possibility
of complementary state and federal regulation) were of importance only indirectly in determining the. intent of Congress.
Seventy years ago the Court found that the business of
public warehousing is affected with a public interest and its
regulation by the state is appropriate and constitutionally
2. 39 Stat. 486 (1916), as amended 46 Stat. 1463 (1931), 7 U.S.C.
§ 241 et seq. (1940).
3. 156 F.2d 33 (C.C.A. 7th 1946).
4. The Court found that the following items in the complaint had
in some way been regulated by §§ 2-9, 13, 15, 18, 21, and 25 of
the Warehouse Act: just and reasonable rates; discrimination;
storing and dealing in warehouseman's own grain while storing
grain for the public; maintenance of inadequate and inefficient
warehouse service; operating without a state license; abandonment
of warehouse; failure to file and publish rate schedules.
5. The Court found that the Warehouse Act contains no provisions
relating expressly to financing and control of financial structures.
Thus, the failure to secure prior approval of the Illinois Commission for contracts with affiliates and other public utilities and
the, issuance of securities are subject to the control of the state.

6. 46 Stat. 1463, 1465 (1931), 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1940).
7. U.S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
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permissible.8 By the time Congress enacted the Warehouse
Act" in 1916, the states had provided extensive laws regulating grain elevators, and the Act was expressly declared to
be subservient to state laws relating to warehouses. 10 In fact
before a warehouseman could obtain a federal license he had
to provide a bond securing performance of his obligations as
a warehouseman under state law." The Act neither in its
original nor in its amended form makes it mandatory for all
public warehousemen engaged in interstate commerce to obtain a federal license. The obtaining of such license is entirely up to the discretion of the warehouseman. Those who
obtain a license cannot be compelled to perform any positive
duties. The only sanction for failure to comply with the
few regulations set out in the Act is loss of license, with the
exception of certain penalties in the case of fraud.
A main purpose of the Warehouse Act was to make it
possible to properly finance agricultural products while in
storage by standardizing warehousing methods so that uniform receipts might be issued. 12 However, since the Warehouse Act was subservient to state laws the desired uniformity was not achieved. Bankers claimed it was impossible to
keep track of the various regulations of the forty-eight states
as well as the federal regulations, and consequently they
could not safely rely on such warehouse receipts. Because
of these contentions of the uncertainty of the value of grain
receipts for collateral purposes due to the dual system of
regulation of federally licensed warehouses, the Secretary of
Agriculture in 1928 proposed an amendment to the Warehouse Act to make it independent of any state legislation on
warehousing.23 The main feature of the amendment was the
deletion from §6 of the requirement of a bond securing faithful performance of state requirements and a revision of §29
to make the Secretary of Agriculture's authority exclusive
with respect to federal licensees.' 4 A unanimous committee
reported the bill to the House of Representatives where it
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

3,Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
39 Stat. 486 (1916).
Id. § 29.
Id. § 6.
H. R. Rep. No. 60, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
H. R. Rep. No. 2314, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929).
46 Stat. 1463 (1931) 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1940): "In the discretion of
the Secretary of Agriculture he is authorized to cooperate with
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was passed without opposition or debate. 15 Mr. Clarke of
the Committee on Agriculture in reporting the bill to the
House said, "To make the law accomplish the real purpose
of Congress, it should be independent of any state legislation on the subject. The amendments proposed to section
29 of this bill aim to make the Federal Warehouse Act stand
on its own bottom."' 10 Senator McNary speaking for the
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry reported to the Senate, "The Act has demonstrated beyond question its usefulness in the marketing of our agricultural .products. But
experience has demonstrated that it can and should be
strengthened. With that in mind the amendments embodied
in H.R. 7 are offered . . . . Section 29 of the Act now provides [quoting section]. The effect of this wording is to make
the Federal Act subservient to State acts wherever there is
a conflict ....
this feature militates against the full value
of Federal Warehouse receipts for collateral purposes. The
amendment proposed to this section would make the Federal
Act independent of State laws ....
and if it is decided to
secure a license under the Federal Act then the warehouseman
would be authorized to operate without regard to State Acts
and be solely responsible to the Federal Act ....
In other
words, it leaves it with the warehousemen to decide whether
they wish to operate under the State or Federal law and
having made this choice they shall then be17permitted to operate Without interference of any agency."
Section 29 of the Warehouse Act as thus amended by
Congress in 1931, first of all gives the Secretary of Agriculture authority to cooperate with state officials charged with
enforcing state warehouse laws. Next, it says that "the
power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this Act shall be exclusive with
State officials charged with the enforcement of State laws relating
to warehouses, warehousemen, weighers, graders, inspectors,
samplers, or classifiers; but the power, jurisdiction, and authority
conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this chapter
shall be exclusive with respect to all persons securing a license
hereunder so long as tsaid license remains in effect. This chapter
shall not be construed so as to limit the operation of any statute
of the United States relating to warehouses . . . now in force.

15.
16.
17.

72 Cong. Rec., 8529 (1930).
H. R. Rep. No. 4, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929).
S. Rep. No. 1775, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931).

..
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respect to all persons securing a license hereunder."1" Giving
the Secretary authority to cooperate and at the same time
giving him exclusive authority seems on the face to be contradictory. However, the accompanying committee reports,
supra, make clear that Congress did intend for licensees to
be solely responsible to the Warehouse Act and not to state
laws. Before the principal case was litigated, the view had
been taken by the Supreme Court, as well as by other authorities, that the Warehouse Act was an example of exclusive
regulation.1 9 However it should be noted the holding of the
Court in the principal case is that federally licensed Warehousemen are free from state regulation only in that part
of the field in any way covered by the federal regulations.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting,2o after weighing the
practical administrative defects of the Warehouse Act, does
not find that Congress intended by the amendment to exclude
state regulation where there is no conflict. He validly points
out the lack of affirmative policy-fixing authority in the Secretary of Agriculture, the vast body of state law invalidated,
the possibility of no regulation at all outside the "very narrow
scope of the Secretary's powers," and the ease with which
the state legislation could supplement the Warehouse Act.
Thus since this legislation has administrative weaknesses,
Justice Frankfurter says the Court should not impute to Congress the desire to exclude state regulation,2 ' even though in
the opinion of the writer that is the only clear meaning that
can be derived from reading the history of this amendment.
18. See n. 14, supra.
19. The Supreme Court itself cited the Warehouse Act as an example
of the following proposition: "where the United States specifically

exercises its power of legislation so as to conflict with a regulation
of the states, . . . the state legislation becomes inoperative and

the federal legislation exclusive in its application." Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156, n. 6 (1941). See In re
Farmers Cooperative Ass'n., 69 S.D. 191, 8 N.W. 2d 557 (1943);
Braden "Umpire to the Federal System," 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
20.
21.

27, 29, n. 18 (1942).
Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in the dissent.
In discharging "the duty of judicially adjusting the interests of

both the Nation and the State," Justice Frankfurter has consistently given the interpretation to federal and state acts which will
permit both state and national regulation to stand. See the
following dissenting opinions either written by or concurred in

by Justice Frankfurter: Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. N.Y. State Labor
Relations Board, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026, 1032 (1947); First Iowa HydroElectric Co-op. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S. 152, 183
(1946); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547 (1945); Cloverleaf Butter
Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 170 (1942).

